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Introduction
On July 25, 2011, Charles Murphy went to sit down for lunch and
found a mess of food and water on his seat.1 As a prisoner at Vandalia
Correctional Center, Mr. Murphy ate at an assigned seat at a
designated time.2 He reported the mess on his seat to Correctional
Officer Smith, who ended up escorting Mr. Murphy from the dining
area in handcuffs.3 Officer Smith brought Mr. Murphy to segregation,
where another Officer asked him some questions.4 When Mr. Murphy
was not forthcoming, Officer Smith started putting “his finger in and
1.

Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 784
(2018).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.
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out of Murphy’s ear, while asking Murphy if he was deaf.”5 Officer
Smith’s juvenile behavior quickly escalated to violence after Mr.
Murphy, remaining relatively calm, talked back.6 Smith hit Murphy in
the face and put him in a chokehold until he passed out.7 Then, Smith
and another officer dragged the unconscious Mr. Murphy into a cell and
pushed him onto the ground.8 Mr. Murphy’s head hit the cell’s metal
toilet on the way down.9 Smith and the other officer stripped Mr.
Murphy and left him lying on the ground, where he stayed for more
than half an hour before anyone checked his condition.10 The assault
left Murphy with a “crushed” eye socket that required surgery.11
Mr. Murphy sued the officers for excessive force and recovered
$307,733.82 in damages, along with $108,446.54 in attorney’s fees.12
But, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), suits brought
by prisoners are subject to special rules that do not apply in other civil
suits.13 One of the provisions of the PLRA works to limit available
attorney’s fees by requiring that up to 25% of a prisoner plaintiff’s
judgment be applied toward the award of attorney fees.14 After the
Supreme Court ruled in Mr. Murphy’s case, the defendants were
responsible only for $31,513.09 in attorney’s fees.15 Basically, being a
prisoner cost Mr. Murphy about $77,000.16
5.

Id.

6.

Id. (“Murphy did not struggle with the officers as they walked, although
he taunted Officer Smith, promising what would happen the next time he
‘ain’t got no handcuffs on.’”).

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Id. at 655–56.

11.

Id. at 656.

12.

Id.

13.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (listing those rules).

14.

Id. § 1997e(d)(2) (“Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded [to a prisoner
plaintiff who is also awarded attorney’s fees], a portion of the judgment
(not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s
fees awarded against the defendant.”).

15.

Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 787 (2018) ($108,446.54 minus 25% of
$307,733.82 is $31,513.09).

16.

See id. As a practical matter, prisoner plaintiffs might enter into any of a
number of types of fee arrangements with attorneys, and payment schedules
and enforcement procedures are beyond the scope of the Note. For the
sake of clarity, most of the discussion herein will assume that attorneys
typically charge prisoner plaintiffs a reasonable fee based on a reasonable
hourly rate, as opposed to working pro bono or on a contingent fee basis,
and that the prisoner plaintiff is expected to pay the entire fee regardless
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Charles Murphy fared relatively well under the PLRA. Presumably,
after paying his attorneys, he was left with over $200,000 in damages.
This may be significantly less than what the jury determined would
make him whole, but it is more than most prisoners can hope for. Jeffery
Royal, for example, had his wheelchair confiscated by prison officers,
forcing him to crawl on the ground.17 When he filed grievances against
them, they retaliated by putting him in administrative segregation for
two months.18 He sued for retaliation violative of his First Amendment
rights and won, but since he didn’t suffer a physical injury as a result
of the segregation, he was awarded only $1 in nominal damages.19 Royal
persisted through lengthy and expensive litigation, and since he
ultimately proved in court that the prison officials had wrongfully
violated his constitutional rights, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act
of 1976 entitled him to an award of “reasonable attorney’s fee[s]”.20 The
PLRA limited his award of attorney’s fees to $1.50.21
The PLRA was intended to reduce only frivolous prisoner
litigation,22 but its attorney’s fees provisions severely reduce the
compensation awarded to prisoner plaintiffs who have proven in court
that their claims have merit.23 The reduction in attorney’s fees directly
works against prisoners who have vindicated their rights, and it deters

of any award of attorney’s fees. The award, in theory, functions as compensation to the plaintiff for her costs. This is consistent with the theory
underlying the policy of fee shifting in America, see infra Part I, as well
as the treatment that courts typically give attorney’s fees. See, e.g.,
Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying 10% of the
judgment toward the fee award by ordering the entire $1 damages award
and merely reducing the $1.50 attorney’s fee award to $1.40). The purpose
of the Note is analyzing the policy supporting the competing
interpretations of the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provisions. As such, fee
awards will be considered money in the pockets of plaintiffs to be used to
pay their legal bills.
17.

Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).

18.

Id. at 727.

19.

Id. at 726 (majority opinion).

20.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

21.

Royal, 375 F.3d at 726. The attorney’s fees provisions of the PLRA
include the phrase “[i]f the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than
150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant,”
which has been interpreted as a hard cap on attorney’s fees at 150% of
the judgment. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d)(2); see, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d
660, 667 (6th Cir. 2001).

22.

141 Cong. Rec. 4275 (1995) (statement of Rep. Charles Canady).

23.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
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attorneys from representing clients with meritorious claims.24 An
excessive-force claim against a prison guard will elicit a smaller
attorney’s fee award than the exact same claim against a police officer,
even if everything else—the injury, the damages award, the strength of
evidence offered, the culpability of the wrongdoer, the amount of time
and energy spent proving the claim, the reasonable attorney’s fee
calculated by the court, etc.—were the same.25 The exact same right
vindicated in the exact same circumstances being compensated to a
lesser degree solely because of the plaintiff’s status as a prisoner means
that rights of prisoners are simply afforded less value. This Note will
explore how the PLRA provisions governing attorney’s fees have been
misinterpreted to the detriment of prisoner plaintiffs. Part I will provide
some background about the scheme of attorney’s fee awards in the
United States, particularly the policy rationale behind when such fees
are awarded. Part II will describe the PLRA’s fee provisions and revisit
the legislative history in the appropriate context provided by Part I.
Part III will discuss how courts have failed to properly interpret the
attorney’s fees provisions of the PLRA, with a special focus on the
shallow analysis employed in Murphy v. Smith.26 Part IV will provide
an alternate interpretation that better conforms to both the text of the
statute and the purpose of the PLRA; one that does not unjustly reduce
the value of prisoners’ rights.

I. The American Rule and the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Act
In the United States, the general rule governing the allocation of
attorney’s fees is the American Rule. In affirming that the American
Rule is the default doctrine and the starting point for any judicial decision to award fees, the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Society27 stated the rule clearly and succinctly: “In the
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect
a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”28 Each party is responsible
24.

Walker, 257 F.3d at 670 (“We are aware that § 1997e(d)(2) will have a
strong chilling effect upon counsels’ willingness to represent prisoners who
have meritorious claims.”); Karen M. Klotz, Comment, The Price of Civil
Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Attorney’s Fee-Cap Provision
as a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws, 73 Temp. L. Rev. 759,
790–92 (2000); Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal
Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate
Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 999, 1020 (2001).

25.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). For an illustration, see Branham, supra note 24,
at 1000–02.

26.

138 S. Ct. 784 (2018).

27.

421 U.S. 240 (1974).

28.

Id. at 247.
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for her own costs, regardless of the outcome. This explicit rejection of
the English Rule—which can force the loser to pay the costs incurred
by the winning party—has been a feature of American jurisprudence
for the vast majority of our country’s history.29
This shift in fee allocation represents a reflection of American values
of “democracy and individualism.”30 One supposed effect of the English
Rule is that plaintiffs hesitate to press even meritorious claims in order
to avoid having to pay their opponents’ fees, disproportionately chilling
suits by poor plaintiffs.31 The American Rule recalibrates this balance
of power and incentives. When parties generally have to pay only their
own attorney’s fees, potential plaintiffs’ concerns that they might be
slammed with the costs of their opponents’ defense and defendants’ fear
of having to finance attacks against them are both mitigated. While the
original rationale for this default rule may be difficult to discern from
a historical perspective,32 in 1967 the Supreme Court described a justification that has been embraced in modern times as a major part of the
policy underpinning the practice: poor plaintiffs are discouraged from
bringing suits to “vindicate their rights” when failure means taking on
their opponents’ fees.33
29.

The American Rule was the “general practice” in the States by at least
1796, when the Supreme Court reversed a lower court that had awarded
fees. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see also Phyllis
A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees
and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 Alb. L. Rev. 148, 150–54 (1981).

30.

John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1635 (1993);
see also John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, 10, 17–18
(1984) (suggesting that “frontier individualism” and the application of
freedom of contract to attorney-client arrangements played an ideological
role in the formulation in the rule); Monroe, supra note 29, at 152–54.

31.

Mary Frances Derfner, The True “American Rule” Drafting Fee
Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 251, 256,
n.16 (1979); David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America:
Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and
“English Rule,” 15 Ind. Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 583, 607–08 (2005);
Monroe, supra note 29, at 149.

32.

Vargo, supra note 30, at 1634 (“[T]here is little historical information
about the policies of the American Rule.”). See generally Leubsdorf, supra
note 30, at 9 (opening with “[i]n a sense, the American rule has no history”
and arguing that the ideological factors that are typically said to support
the rule do not actually explain its origin).

33.

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
(“[I]t has been argued that . . . the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing
included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”); see also Thomas Allan
Heller, An Overview of the Law of Attorney Fees in the United States:
The American Rule Is Not So Simple After All, 10 LeXonomica 51
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The same justification has been extended to support the myriad of
fee-shifting statutes that amend the American Rule in certain circumstances, reflecting the idea’s significance to the fee-allocation regime
in the United States. Congress has passed hundreds of fee-shifting
statutes34 authorizing courts to assess a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s
fees against the defendant in many situations.35 A frequent justification
for this sort of fee-shifting is the “private attorney general” theory36
that encouraging individual citizens who have suffered harm to sue
wrongdoers is good for everyone because there is a collective or state
interest in the vindication of important individual rights or other
“polic[ies] that Congress consider[s] of the highest priority.”37
This interest is strongest in situations where a large corporation or
government actor infringes on the fundamental rights of a potential
plaintiff who both belongs to a vulnerable population and would typically not be able to afford litigation against a resource-rich defendant.38
Awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in these cases works both
ends of the problem by removing a financial barrier to pursuing claims
that are in the public interest and increasing the financial incentive to
avoid harming others.
If widening access to the justice system for poor plaintiffs is a core
feature of the American Rule, then one-way fee shifting39 when defendants are particularly powerful or the rights being vindicated are

(2018); Vargo, supra note 30, at 1635 (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp.,
386 U.S. at 718) (“Litigation of basic rights was not to be discouraged by
rules that denied access to the courts.”); Monroe, supra note 29, at 153–54.
34.

Heller, supra note 33, at 53.

35.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (fair
housing); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (employment); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d)
(consumer protection).

36.

Armand Derfner, Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fee Awards Act of 1976, 37 Urb. Law. 653, 654 & n. 6 (2005) (quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))
(attributing the term to Judge Jerome Frank (citing Associated Indus. of
N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943))); Heller, supra note 33,
at 53 (“[T]he so-called Private Attorney General doctrine . . . provides
that a plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees when he or she has
effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has benefitted a large
class of people . . . .”).

37.

Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402.

38.

See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 717,
718–22 (2010).

39.

“One-way” fee shifting refers to the common fee shifting schemes that
favor awarding fees to plaintiffs but not necessarily defendants. Root, supra
note 31, at 588.
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particularly important is a natural exception to the Rule.40 In fact, oneway fee-shifting statutes and other exceptions to the basic American
Rule have become so prevalent that any understanding of the “true”
American Rule is not complete without recognition that there is a
conditional one-way fee shift when there is a public interest involved.41
Indeed, once the Supreme Court recognized the private-attorneygeneral theory as the justification for fee-shifting statutes,42 lower courts
began using the theory to award attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs
even where no statute authorized the award.43 It didn’t take long for
the Supreme Court to clarify that only Congress can define the conditions under which the private-attorney-general theory supports a
policy of fee shifting.44 Alyeska reestablished the American Rule as the
guiding principle for courts, eliminating judges’ discretion to shift fees
under the private-attorney-general theory without specific statutory
authorization.45 Relying on a statute from 1853, the Alyeska Court
erased judicial discretion to award attorney’s fees “when the interests
of justice so require.”46
Congress responded with its own clarification. In the year following
the decision in Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988: “In any action
or proceeding to enforce a provision of [certain civil rights statutes] . . .
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs . . . .”47
Put simply, § 1988 “authoriz[es] the district courts to award a
reasonable attorney’s fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation,”
40.

Derfner, supra note 36, at 654. One-way fee shifting offers the greatest
mitigation of concerns about poor plaintiffs not being able to afford to
press worthwhile claims because it offers the benefit of the English Rule—
i.e., plaintiffs are made whole without incurring fees—without the risk.
See Vargo, supra note 30, at 1635 (“A fee-shifting rule that operates as a
one-way shift in favor of injured plaintiffs affords the greatest access to
justice.”).

41.

Derfner, supra note 31, at 281 (“[T]he real American rule, every bit as
deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy is that attorneys
fees are granted in the United States to private parties who act as agents
of public policy.” (footnote omitted)); Derfner, supra note 36, at 654.

42.

Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 (examining the rationale behind the feeshifting provisions to determine that they typically direct courts to award
fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust”).

43.

Derfner, supra note 36, at 655–56.

44.

Id. at 656–57; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.
240, 263 (1975).

45.

Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 260–64.

46.

Id. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

47.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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but courts have had to wrestle with what it means to be a “prevailing
party” and what it means for an attorney’s fee to be “reasonable.”48 A
plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees when
the court grants some “relief on the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claim [that]
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying
the defendant’s behavior” to the plaintiff’s benefit.49 Notably, a plaintiff
is a prevailing party even when she wins only nominal damages.50 The
value of shifting the burden of attorney’s fees to defendants comes from
the nature of the right that was violated and not from the value of the
money judgment awarded.51
Section 1988 authorizes attorney’s fees awards for both prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, but under different standards.52
When authorized by statutes such as § 1988, courts should exercise
their discretion and award fees to prevailing plaintiffs, except in unusual
circumstances.53 Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, should be
awarded fees only when dragged into court by suits that are “clearly
frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes.”54
Once the court determines that a party has prevailed, the next step
is to calculate a “reasonable” fee using the “lodestar” method of multiplying the reasonable number of hours spent by the reasonable hourly

48.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).

49.

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992).

50.

Id. at 112.

51.

City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574–75 (1986) (“[A] successful
civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not
reflected in nominal or relatively small damages awards. . . . Because
damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil
rights litigation, Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases, unlike
most private law cases, to depend on obtaining substantial monetary
relief.”).

52.

Derfner, supra note 36, at 660.

53.

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (reasoning
that the private attorney-general theory supports applying the statute
such that prevailing plaintiffs “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust”). Piggie
Park predates § 1988, but it involved a fee-shifting statute using substantially
the same language conferring discretion to award fees to a “prevailing
party.” Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)).
The Senate report that accompanied the passing of section 1988 cited
Piggie Park to indicate that courts should default to granting authorized
awards to prevailing plaintiffs, and the Court embraced this directive.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.

54.

S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States,
385 F. Supp. 346, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975));
see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978);
Derfner, supra note 36, at 660.
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rate, often based on “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”55 Once determined, this figure is presumed reasonable and automatically accounts for all the relevant factors, though the fee could be
enhanced if the party requesting the fee provides specific evidence of
extraordinary circumstances.56 By definition, fees calculated using the
lodestar amount are not excessive fees that could be considered a
windfall to overzealous attorneys chasing fee awards.57
The private-attorney-general theory has persisted as the core of fee
shifting in civil-rights cases. Prisoner litigation brought to redress
violations of constitutional rights falls squarely into the purview of
§ 1988 and its underlying philosophy, which strikes a balance between
deterring frivolous suits and encouraging meritorious ones.58 It is against
this background that Congress turned specifically toward the feeshifting regime in suits brought by prisoner plaintiffs.

II. Legislative Failure
A.

The Attorney’s Fees Provisions of the PLRA and the
Private-Attorney-General Theory

Alyeska practically invited Congress to legislate on the appropriate
scheme of fee shifting in any given circumstance.59 As discussed in the
previous section, determining whether and how to shift fees involves
balancing the public’s interest in seeing certain rights vindicated
against concerns about frivolous litigation and unjust penalties against
losing parties. Failing to thoroughly consider the appropriate factors
can lead to unjust results, and failing to word fee-shifting statutes clearly and carefully can lead to results that undermine the intent behind
them.60 In 1996, when Congress passed the PLRA and its attorney’s
fees provisions, it redistributed prisoner-litigation costs either without
providing sufficient clarity regarding how they should be applied and
55.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986).

56.

Perdue v. Winn ex rel Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552–53 (2010).

57.

See id. at 552 (“[A] reasonable attorney’s fee is one that is adequate to
attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 897)).

58.

S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5 (“[Section 1988] deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorneys’ fees against a party shown to have litigated
in ‘bad faith’ under the guise of attempting to enforce the Federal rights
created by the statutes listed . . . .”); see Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 829
(2011) (separating frivolous claims from non-frivolous ones brought in the
same action for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant).

59.

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975)
(“[I]t is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by redistributing
litigation costs . . . .”).

60.

Derfner, supra note 31, at 276–81.
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possibly without due consideration of the appropriate factors.61 The
PLRA provisions regarding attorney’s fees, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(d), are as follows:
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees
are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not
be awarded, except to the extent that—
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving
an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a
statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under
section 1988 of this title; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the
court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered
for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action
described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to
exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of
attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of
attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment,
the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in
paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150
percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title
18 for payment of court-appointed counsel.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from
entering into an agreement to pay an attorney’s fee in an amount
greater than the amount authorized under this subsection, if the
fee is paid by the individual rather than by the defendant pursuant to section 1988 of this title.62

As interpreted by courts to date, paragraph (1) ensures that
attorneys cannot recover fees for services or claims ancillary to proving
a violation of constitutional rights or for claims that fail.63 Paragraph
(2) is the fee-shifting portion of the statute. The first sentence has
recently been found to require that the full 25% of a prevailing prisoner
plaintiff’s judgment be put toward the award of attorney’s fees before
61.

A discussion of the relevant legislative history appears below, infra Part
II(B).

62.

42 U.S.C § 1997e(d).

63.

See, e.g., Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a fee award calculated under the PLRA cannot include time
spent by counsel on unsuccessful claims).
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the defendant is responsible for any amount of that award.64 The second
sentence is read as a hard cap on available attorney’s fees, limiting the
fees to 150% of the judgment,65 even when a nominal-damages judgment
results in the reduction of the award to $1.50 when a reasonable fee
might have been thousands of dollars.66 Paragraph (3) establishes a
maximum rate that attorneys can use to calculate their fees, supplanting the “reasonable” rates allowed under § 1988 with rates no more
that 150% greater than the rates established by the Judicial Conference
for payment of court-appointed attorneys.67 Paragraph (4) simply
clarifies that attorneys and prisoners are free to agree on fees that
exceed those available as an award.68
This scheme of fee awards does not completely recategorize prisoners as plaintiffs who do not deserve fee shifting grounded in the
private attorney-general theory. Paragraph (1) mitigates against concerns about frivolous litigation by ensuring that fees are “directly and
reasonably” connected to claims that implicate important rights and
are comparable to fees paid to public servants, but it stops short of
completely overwriting § 1988 for prisoner suits.69 Paragraphs (1) and
(3) work together to limit the possibility of prisoners with less-thanmeritorious claims being awarded excessive fees while still compensating
attorneys who help prisoners prove actual constitutional violations.70
The prevailing interpretation of paragraph (2) departs from this model.
The hard cap on fees at 150% of the judgment predicates the fee award
on the ability of the prisoner plaintiff to win damages as opposed to
“proving [a] . . . violation of [her] rights.”71 When coupled with the
PLRA’s elimination of damages for non-physical injury, certain
violations of constitutional rights that result in legally recognized actual
injury to prisoners become completely excepted from § 1988 fee shifting,
64.

Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 786, 790 (2018). A critique of this
interpretation and the Court’s reasoning in Murphy appears below. See
infra Part III.

65.

See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2001). This is another
arguably erroneous interpretation of the text. See infra Part III(B).

66.

See, e.g., Keup v. Hopkins, 596 F.3d 899, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2010); Boivin
v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2000).

67.

42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(d)(3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1).

68.

42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(d)(4).

69.

Id. § 1997e(d)(1) (“In any action brought by a prisoner . . . in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 . . . such fees shall not
be awarded, except to the extent that [the following conditions are met].”
(emphasis added)).

70.

Paragraph (1) codifies the narrow availability of fees, and paragraph (3)
ensures that the rate used to calculate a reasonable fee is not excessive.
Id. § 1997e(d).

71.

Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A).
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even when properly proved in court.72 Further, the mandate that a
defendant is not responsible for an attorney’s fee award until that award
exceeds 25% of the prisoner plaintiff judgment effectively forces the
prevailing plaintiff to pay at least some of her own fees. These provisions return parties engaged in prisoner litigation to the classic American
Rule in whole or in part, depending entirely on the amount of damages
awarded rather than on the public interest in vindicating the right that
was violated.
The un-shifting of fees under paragraph (2) works to discourage all
prisoner litigation relative to civil-rights litigation by non-prisoners,
regardless of merit or frivolousness and without accounting for the
effects of the rest of the PLRA.73 A review of the PLRA’s legislative
history casts some doubt on to whether Congress intended this effect.74
While the record provides little insight into how each provision of the
PLRA is justified in light of the others and in pursuit of Congress’s
stated objective, the objective is clearly articulated as the prevention
of frivolous suits without hindering meritorious claims.75 As explored
below, Congress either did not thoroughly consider the effects of the
attorney’s fees provision in the context of the PLRA overall, or they
simply drafted an unclear statute that has been misinterpreted.76
B.

The Relevant Legislative History of the PLRA

The express purpose of the PLRA was to reduce frivolous prisoner
litigation through wide-reaching and comprehensive reforms to when
and how a prisoner can bring a claim in federal court.77 Proponents of
72.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith, 805 Fed. App’x 893, 905 (11th Cir. 2020)
(remanding to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff’s
injuries from being pepper sprayed were de minimis, in which case only
nominal damages are appropriate and the 1997e(d)(2) fee caps would limit
the fee award to less than $15).

73.

Branham, supra note 24, at 1029–34; Klotz, supra note 24, at 793. See
infra Part IV(B).

74.

See infra Part II(B).

75.

141 Cong. Rec. 35,797 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The crushing
burden of these frivolous suits is not only costly, but makes it difficult for
courts to consider meritorious claims. Indeed, I do not want to prevent
inmates from raising legitimate claims.”).

76.

In 1979, over a decade before the PLRA was passed, one commentator
wrote that “[a] careless attitude on the part of Congress can result not
only in attorneys fee provisions which are ineffective or anomalous, but
also in provisions which are extremely counter productive.” Derfner, supra
note 31, at 276.

77.

When the PLRA was being considered it sported the following an epitaph:
“A BILL [t]o provide for appropriate remedies for prison condition lawsuits, to discourage frivolous and abusive prison lawsuits, and for other
purposes.” Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, S. 1279, 104th Cong.
(1995); see also 142 Cong. Rec. 5193 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
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the bill pursued this objective by packaging together provisions limiting
access to and recovery from courts, including the imposition of stringent
exhaustion requirements,78 restriction of courts’ discretion to waive
filing fees for indigent prisoners,79 revocation of prisoners’ ability to
bring claims for mental or emotional injury “without a prior showing
of physical injury,”80 and, of course, limitations on the recovery of
attorney’s fees.81 While proponents of the bill declared that they did
not intend to frustrate meritorious prisoner litigation, they did not
explain how the legislation would avoid stifling meritorious claims.82
Nor did they bother to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous
claims when explaining their reasoning; in fact, some argue that the
PLRA “was clearly designed to cut the number of all lawsuits filed by
prisoners,” not just the frivolous ones.83
Congress’s deliberation over the PLRA was notoriously short84 and
one-sided.85 Large swaths of the record are dominated by retellings of
the most extreme examples of frivolous prisoner lawsuits the proponents

(“Its proponents say that the PLRA is merely an attempt to reduce
frivolous prisoner litigation over trivial matters. In reality, the PLRA is a
far-reaching effort to strip Federal courts of the authority to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions.”).
78.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006);
Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping
and Executive Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 291, 301–02 (2007); Kathleen J. McCabe,
Note, Woodford v. Ngo: Creating a Barrier to Justice Using the PLRA
Exhaustion Provision, 17 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 277 (2007).

79.

28 U.S.C. § 1915. See generally Joshua D. Franklin, Comment, Three
Strikes and You’re Out of Constitutional Rights? The Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s “Three Strikes” Provision and Its Effect on Indigents, 71
U. Colo. L. Rev. 191 (2000); Walker Newell, An Irrational Oversight:
Applying the PLRA’s Fee Restrictions to Collateral Prisoner Litigation,
15 CUNY L. Rev. 53 (2011).

80.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

81.

Id. § 1997e(d).

82.

See 141 Cong. Rec. 35,797 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

83.

Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical
Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant to?, 49
UCLA L. Rev. 1655, 1667 (2002).

84.

See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 5193 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
Shay & Kalb, supra note 78, at 300 (noting that the PLRA was “[p]assed
hastily and with scant legislative history”).

85.

Winslow, supra note 83, at 1666–67; Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away with More than Just Crunchy
Peanut Butter, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 203, 209–14 (2004); Katherine A.
Macfarlane, Procedural Animus, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 1185, 1213–18 (2020).
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could find, curated precisely for the purpose of justifying restrictions.86
Supporters of the PLRA bolstered this anecdotal evidence with statistics, focusing on the cost of defending prisoner litigation, the increase
in sheer volume of prisoner claims, and the low rate of prisoner plaintiff
success.87 Like the anecdotal accounts of frivolous cases, these statistics
were largely mischaracterized.88 For example, the increase in prisoner
claims was colored as a crisis of frivolous litigation, but the increase in
prisoners bringing claims lagged behind the increase in the country’s
prison population overall—between 1980 and 1996, “the rate at which
inmates filed petitions” actually declined.89
More troubling than the questionable connection between the evidence of a problem and actual frivolousness of prisoner claims is the
questionable connection between caps on attorney’s fees and reducing
frivolous claims. Proponents of the PLRA were greatly concerned with
the estimated $81.3 million in taxpayer money spent annually on defending prisoner suits, though that figure does not distinguish between
meritorious and frivolous claims.90 Many PLRA provisions—the exhaustion requirement and filing-fee limits, for example—mitigate costs
on the front end of prisoner litigation by diverting minor claims to

86.

Proponents of the bill frequently bemoaned prisoners who brought claims
over things like chunky peanut butter and bad haircuts, but commentators
have suggested that these suits were mischaracterized. Macfarlane, supra
note 85, at 1217–18; Chen, supra note 85, at 213–14. At one point, a list
titled “Top 10 Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits Nationally” was entered into
the record. 141 Cong. Rec. 27,045 (1995).

87.

E.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 38,276 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl); Winslow,
supra note 83, at 1663–65.

88.

Winslow, supra note 83, at 1665 (“[T]he numbers introduced by PLRA
proponents were technically correct, but . . . introduced without context.”).

89.

Id. at 1663 (quoting John Scalia, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Prisoner
Petitions in the Federal Courts, 1980–96 Federal Justice
Statistics Program 5 (1980–96) (noting that, while the number of
petitions filed increased, the rate decreased 17%)). As for the high rate of
prisoner suits “dismissed without the inmate receiving anything,” success
rates of non-prisoner civil suits from about the same time the PLRA was
passed are similarly low, and a closer examination of dismissed prisoner
claims would probably have revealed that most dismissals had nothing to
do with whether the suit was frivolous or not. Id. at 1665–66 (quoting
Letter from Attorneys General of Nevada, California, Arizona, and
Missouri, Chairs and Vice-Chairs of NAAG Inmate Litig. Task Force and
NAAG Crim. L. Comm., to Senator Bob Dole (Sept. 19, 1995), reprinted
in 141 Cong. Rec. S14,417-18 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)).

90.

Id. at 1664–65; 141 Cong. Rec. 26,553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole);
141 Cong. Rec. 38,276 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Concerns about
the burden of prisoner litigation on taxpayers have not disappeared. See
generally Sarah Vandenbraak Hart, Evaluating Institutional Prisoner’s
Rights Litigation: Costs and Benefits and Federalism Considerations, 11
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 73 (2008).
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grievance processes and by giving courts tools with which to easily dismiss meritless claims.91 The provisions capping attorney’s fees, however,
directly apply only to prisoner plaintiffs who have proven that their
constitutional rights were violated.92 In contrast to the procedural
changes described above, the fee-capping provisions can deter frivolous
suits only indirectly, by lowering the value of a positive outcome in
court. Not only is it unclear why the presumably cost-efficient feeshifting process under § 1988 is inadequate, but the deterrent effect of
PLRA fee capping is questionable at best.93
At first glance, the attorney’s fees provisions of the PLRA might
be an appropriate response to concerns about frivolous prisoner litigation based on the same basic logic as the shift from the English Rule
to the American Rule, only in reverse.94 If the private-attorney-general
theory, through § 1988, provided too much incentive for prisoner
claims, then it would make sense to mitigate the pro-plaintiff effect that
§ 1988 has on prisoner litigation by passing prisoner-specific attorney’s
fees rules. But the attorney’s fees provisions of the PLRA were not
passed on their own; they were passed together with an exhaustion
requirement, filing-fee provisions, a physical-injury requirement, and
more.95 Since there was no reason for Congress to believe these other
provisions would be ineffective, the fee-capping provisions were perhaps
predictably redundant, especially since fee-shifting under § 1988 already
struck a balance that both discouraged frivolous suits and encouraged
meritorious ones.96
Why burden successful prisoner plaintiffs with reduced attorney’s
fees if frivolous litigation could and would be limited by the more direct
and efficient procedural changes? The cynical answer is that Congress
did not hesitate to overcorrect for frivolousness because it was politically advantageous to appear “tough on crime,” and only prisoners—a
nonvoting population—would be directly harmed.97 A more forgiving
view would note that the PLRA does not make § 1988 attorney’s fees
91.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Though they are arguably more tailored to preventing
frivolous suits than the attorney’s fees provisions, these parts of the PLRA
have also been widely criticized. See, e.g., Shay & Kalb, supra note 78;
McCabe, supra note 78; Franklin supra note 79; Newell, supra note 79.

92.

Prisoners, even more than other civil-rights plaintiffs, are not entitled to
any attorney’s fees until they prove the merit of their claims. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(1).

93.

Id. § 1988; see infra Part IV(B).

94.

See supra text accompanying notes 30–37

95.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

96.

See supra text accompanying notes 31–55.

97.

Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1567
(2003); see Spencer Abraham, Tough on Crime? Not the Clinton Justice
Department, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1996, at A23.
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completely unavailable. In fact, the provisions could be read in a way
that is consistent with both the PLRA’s overall goal of reducing
frivolous prisoner litigation and § 1988’s incentive to pursue constitutional claims. If Congress’s intent was to tailor the PLRA to avoid
unnecessary collateral damage to the ability of prisoner plaintiffs to
pursue meritorious claims—an intent reflected in the construction of
the prerequisites for awarding fees and the cap on hourly rates—then
courts should interpret the fee-shifting provision as consistently as possible with that goal. When given the opportunity to apply the statute
in such a way, courts have instead resolved questions consistently
against prisoner plaintiffs, furthering the PLRA’s overzealous approach
to quashing frivolous prisoner litigation.

III. Judicial Failure
A.

Murphy v. Smith Misses the Mark

Until Murphy, most judges exercised discretion over what amount
between any non-zero portion and 25% of prisoner plaintiffs’ judgments
would be diverted to cover some or all of their attorney’s fees.98 Judges
might allocate as little as a single dollar of the judgment, finding the
defendant responsible for virtually all of the prisoner plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, but in another case enforce the maximum, diverting a quarter
of the plaintiff’s judgment to the fees before putting any of the cost on
the defendant.99 This interpretation gave judges some limited control
over how much the PLRA eroded § 1988’s shift away from the American Rule depending on the distinct factual circumstances. One circuit
court, borrowing from another area of law, directed lower courts to
consider

98.

Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[The] decisions of
other circuits . . . allow such discretion.” (first citing Boesing v. Spiess,
540 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2008); and then citing Parker v. Conway, 581
F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2009))); see, e.g., Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603,
610 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s reduction of the fee award
by 10% of the damages); Farella v. Hockaday, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081–
82 (C.D. Ill. 2004) (applying 10%, $100, as “sufficiently high to recognize
that the plaintiff did not succeed in [all of] his claim[s] . . . and did not
recover punitive damages . . . [but] sufficiently low to recognize the
plaintiff’s pro se status, the fact that counsel was appointed by the court
pro bono, and the seriousness of the constitutional violation”); Morrison
v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (applying a nominal
$1, 0.000666%, of the judgment toward the award “[i]n light of the facts
of this case, the constitutional rights implicated, and the jury’s clear signal
that the Defendants should be punished”); Clark v. Phillips, 965 F. Supp.
331, 338 (N.D. New York 1997) (applying the full 25%, $2,500, when the
plaintiff did not object to the defendant’s request that the court apply the
maximum amount).

99.

Compare Morrison, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 811 with Clark, 965 F. Supp. at 338.
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(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith,
(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of
attorneys’ fees, (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees against
the opposing parties could deter other persons acting under
similar circumstances, and (4) the relative merits of the parties’
positions.100

Wielding “broad discretion” over the “appropriate percentage,” a
district court in the Eighth Circuit could consider other relevant factors
as well, such as the economic impact of the outcome on the parties.101
If the objective of the PLRA was to diligently pursue the delicate
balance between vindicating the private-attorney-general theory and
minimizing the indirect taxpayer funding of prisoner litigation by
putting attorney’s fees costs on government-funded institutions, then
affording the trial judge some discretion makes sense.102 If the objective
was across-the-board reductions in what prisoner plaintiffs take home
in order to indiscriminately discourage prisoner litigation, then
mandatory enforcement of the full 25% makes sense.
With virtually no consideration of the legislative objective, the
Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Smith, interpreted the statute to require
that prisoner plaintiffs fully discharge any fee award out of their
judgment if at all possible, otherwise they must surrender the maximum
25% of their judgment.103 In order to arrive at this interpretation, the
Court purported to follow a conventional model of construction by
beginning with the word choice and grammar of the text and resolving
any ambiguities by considering the context.104 After identifying the
competing interpretations of the statutory language, the Court split the
statute into chunks to be analyzed separately, looking first at “shall be
applied” and then focusing on “to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees
awarded.”105 Taking “shall be applied” as an indication that courts must
apply some part of the judgment and translating “to satisfy the
amount” into “with the purpose of . . . fully discharging,” the Court
100. See Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 2009). The court borrowed
factors first articulated in the employee-benefits-litigation context. Id.
101. Id. Indeed, a brief concurrence in Kahle by Chief Judge Loken cautioned
the district court that failing to apply section 1997e(d)(2) to discharge
the entire fee award on remand could be an abuse of discretion. Id. (Loken,
C.J., concurring). He noted that Kahle’s monetary judgment of $1,100,000
was an enormous sum and that the total fee award of $186,208.88 amounted
to less than 17% of that judgment. Id.
102. See supra Part II(B).
103. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 790 (2018).
104. Id. at 787 (“As always, we start with the specific language in dispute.”).
105. Id. at 787–88 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (“[A] portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of
attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.”)).
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took the meaning of the statute to be the mandatory application of the
full 25% of the judgment toward the fee award.106 The Court failed to
consider, however, that splitting up the text into chunks, translating
the chunks, and then stitching them back together is more likely to
confuse the statute’s actual meaning than reveal it. The majority in
Murphy, content that this reconstructed statute was able to stand on
artificial legs, failed to interpret “applied to satisfy” in the same way it
does “shall be applied” and “to satisfy.”107
As the dissenting opinion pointed out, the plain meaning of “applied
to satisfy” is often “‘applied toward the satisfaction of’ rather that
‘applied in complete fulfillment of,’” which would, in the context of
§ 1997e(d), only require some discretionary non-zero contribution from
the judgment.108 Both the majority and dissenting opinions identified a
common meaning of the words used, backed up their interpretation
with analogies to other situations in which something is “applied” to
“satisfy” a requirement, and offered up alternative language that Congress could have used to more clearly indicate their meaning.109 Anyone
would be hard pressed to read both opinions and still claim that the
text was unambiguous. The majority’s critical error was how it resolved
that ambiguity.
The majority looked to the “larger statutory scheme surrounding
the specific language” of § 1997e(d)(2).110 The statutory context the
Court turned to was primarily the word choice of § 1988 rather than
the surrounding provisions of the PLRA.111 The Court justified this
choice by characterizing § 1988(b) as the law that the PLRA was
designed to constrain, but also because the issue was discretion, which
“[§] 1988(b) confers . . . on district courts in unambiguous terms.”112
The Court reasoned that since the language in § 1988 that specifically
grants courts discretion is absent in § 1997e(d), they cannot both confer
discretion.113 Congress would otherwise not “bother[] to write a new law;
omit all the words that afforded discretion in the old law; and then
106. Id. at 787 (emphasis omitted).
107. Id. at 792 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. Indeed, this is how the text was interpreted by every circuit court to
take up the question before Murphy. Id.
109. Id. at 787–88 (majority opinion); id. at 792–93, 794 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 789 (majority opinion).
111. Id. (“Comparing the terms of the old and new statutes helps to shed a
good deal of light on the parties’ positions. Section 1988(b) confers discretion
on district courts in unambiguous terms: ‘[T]he court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of
the costs’ against the defendant.” (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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replace those old discretionary words with new mandatory ones.”114 This
analysis is deeply flawed. Section 1997e(d) is not a “new” law that
replaces or exists alongside § 1988; it is a provision built on top of
§ 1988 to constrain how it is applied in the specific instance of prisoner
litigation. Section 1988 provides the base law of fee shifting in civilrights cases, and § 1997e(d) works only to modify the application of
that statute.115 The two statutes must be read together.116 The words
“omit[ted]” from § 1997e(d) would be redundant in that section
precisely because they appear in § 1988. These “discretionary words”
are not “replaced” at all because § 1988 still applies.117 District courts
retain discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing prisoner plaintiffs, even as the PLRA provides some limitations on that discretion.
After setting up § 1988(b) as the text to which § 1997e(d)(2) should
be compared, the majority briefly turned to the rest of § 1997e(d)
merely to point out that the other provisions also “seek[] to restrain,
rather than replicate, the discretion found in § 1988(b).”118 Accepting
that this suggests Congress intended paragraph (2) as a restraint on
judicial discretion, it remains unclear why the fact that a statute works
to limit discretion means that it should be construed to eliminate
judicial discretion altogether.
Rather than justifying this elusive logical leap, the majority turned
back to § 1988(b), noting that the Court had rejected the old twelvefactor test that courts had used to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees
and replaced it with the lodestar method because the former afforded

114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) begins as follows: “In any action brought by a
prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title,
such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that . . . .” § 1997e(d)
(footnote omitted). First, the statute immediately recognizes that a
prisoner plaintiff might be entitled to attorney’s fees “under section 1988.”
Id. Then it mandates that the default rule is to not award “such fees,”
but the rest of section 1997e(d) describes when “such fees,” i.e., fees
authorized under section 1988, are allowed. Id. See also, e.g., Walker v.
Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he PLRA modifies the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to prevailing prisoners by providing
stringent limitations on both the availability and the amount of attorney
fee awards.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Morrison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809–11 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(“[T]he suitable approach is to harmonize the expansive approach of
§ 1988 with the more specific requirements of § 1997e(d).”).
117. The Court’s choice of language here reveals its circular logic: it supports
its contested interpretation of the words as mandatory as opposed to discretionary by calling the words “mandatory” and comparing them to other
words that are more clearly discretionary. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 789.
118. Id.
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too little guidance and produced disparate results.119 The majority reasoned that because some guidance was deemed desirable under § 1988,
§ 1997e(d) should be construed to provide maximum guidance in order
avoid the “disparate results” that come from “unguided and freewheeling choice.”120 This reasoning rings hollow given that any discretion that judges might exercise under § 1997e(d) is already constrained
first by the common-law limits on § 1988(b) and further by the other
PLRA provisions affecting awards of attorney’s fees to prisoner plaintiffs. The majority characterized § 1997e(d)(2) as “affording entirely
rudderless discretion,”121 but in reality, judges assessing attorney’s fees
awards under the PLRA enjoy very little discretion compared to other
awards under § 1988.122
Essentially, Murphy conflates limiting discretion with providing
guidance to judges on how to exercise their discretion. As the majority
points out, the text of § 1988(b) is broad but unambiguous: “the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee . . . .”123 The twelve-factor analysis that was eventually
rejected was an attempt by courts, exercising their discretion, to best
determine a reasonable attorney’s fee.124 The source of the test, Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,125 was “cited with approval by both
the House and the Senate” when passing § 1988.126 Once experience revealed the test to be unwieldy, the lodestar method was embraced not
only for its simplicity and consistency but also because it was found to
incorporate all of the appropriate factors.127 Since it was viewed as
accounting for the same factors that supported the twelve-factor test,
preference for the lodestar method should not be viewed as the prioritization of direction at the expense of discretion. Under the lodestar
method, judges retain the same discretion section conferred by
§ 1988(b) that they enjoyed when applying the twelve-factor test; they
119. Id. at 789–90 (citing Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986)).
120. Id. at 790.
121. Id.
122. Fee awards granted to prisoner plaintiffs are first subject to all of the
limitations of § 1988, including the lodestar guidance that the majority
refers to, and then are further limited by the provisions of the PLRA. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d). See supra text accompanying notes 47–70.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 789.
124. Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 562 (“Courts have struggled to formulate the
proper measure for determining the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular fee
award. [The dominant] method . . . involved consideration of 12 factors.”).
125. 488 F.2d 714 (1974).
126. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 562 (first citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at
8 (1976); and then citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)).
127. Id. at 564–65 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
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merely have a more efficient and consistent tool to determine what
constitutes “a reasonable attorney’s fee.”128 Giving § 1997e(d)(2) the
same treatment would mean developing straightforward guidance for
lower court judges on how to determine what portion between one cent
and 25% of the judgment should be reallocated, not removing that
discretion altogether.129
On its face, § 1997e(d) is silent about whether a district-court judge
has discretion over the portion of a judgment that will be applied to
the fees except to (1) mandate that some non-zero amount is applied
and (2) limit the portion to 25%.130 The most grounded indication that
it should otherwise limit the discretion afforded by § 1988(b) comes
from the majority’s own narrow reading of the phrase “to satisfy.”131 At
best, the majority’s logic is circular: supporting the assertion that one
competing interpretation is superior by comparing the words of
§ 1997e(d) as interpreted to those in a related statute. At worst, the
majority, in a vain attempt to achieve efficient and consistent results,
selectively amplified a tenuous textual comparison in order to settle on
an interpretation of the statute that conforms with a policy of limited
discretion for and maximum guidance to district judges.
Other than an attempt to strictly adhere to textualism, there is no
explanation for why the majority in Murphy never engaged with the
congressional intent behind the PLRA. The declaration that “what may
have begun as a close race turns out to have a clear winner” is not
convincing as an assurance that the text is unambiguous, especially
given the robust dispute over the meaning of the plain text and the
majority’s own dependence on § 1988(b) to support its interpretation.132
Members of the majority who do not reject legislative intent out of
hand as textualists may have found the legislative history so unhelpful
that it considered determining Congressional intent a lost cause.133
Even a textualist approach that relies on the statutory context and
ignores the legislative history134—which appears to be precisely how
128. See id. at 562–66.
129. If the Court in Murphy had decided to develop such a test, it would not
have been working against a blank slate. See, e.g., Kahle v. Leonard, 563
F.3d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); see supra text accompanying notes 98–102.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); see infra Part IV.
131. § 1997e(d); see supra text accompanying notes 110–18.
132. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 790 (2018).
133. The closest the majority comes to addressing Congress’s intent is a brief
look at a particular part of the legislative history to dismiss, in a footnote,
one of Murphy’s arguments in support of his position. Id. at 790 n.2 (“Did
anyone voting on the measure even think about this question? There is
no way to know, and we will not try to guess.”).
134. See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory
Interpretation 26–30 (2009).
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Justice Gorsuch attempted to approach Murphy—should yield a
reading of § 1997e(d) that preserves judicial discretion.135 As discussed
below, an interpretation that does not cap attorney’s fees or indiscriminately apply part of the judgment toward them would be far more consistent not only with the plain text, the surrounding text of § 1997e(d),
and the context of § 1988, but also with the purpose of the PLRA,
including the cost concerns of its proponents and the Murphy majority’s
distaste for disparate results.136
B.

The Rest of § 1997e(d)(2): The Illusory Fee Cap

Before turning to how § 1997e(d)(2) should be interpreted, a brief
review of how the rest of that paragraph has also been egregiously misconstrued is warranted, since reading both sentences of § 1997e(d)(2)
together will provide insight into their meaning. The second part of
§ 1997e(d)(2) states: “If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than
150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.”137 This has been interpreted as a hard cap on attorney’s fees
awarded to prisoner plaintiffs that “limit[s] defendants’ liability for
attorney fees to 150 percent of the money judgment.”138 Support for the
fee-capping interpretation is based primarily on the erroneous assumption that § 1997e(d)(2) is rendered “absurd” or “meaningless” unless it
is understood to mean that the defendant is not responsible for an
award that exceeds 150% of the judgment.139
This mistake is the result of a logical fallacy known as the “fallacy
of the inverse.”140 When Congress mandated that the defendant pay any
award of attorney’s fees that does not exceed 150% of the judgment, it
made a clear if-then statement. Courts do not need to read into the
statute that the inverse is true, and to do so is not logically sound.141
The plain text of § 1997e(d) is silent on what happens when the award
does exceed 150% of the judgment. It may be frustrating that
§ 1997e(d)(2) does not tell us what happens when the fee award is

135. First, resolving the ambiguity of § 1997e(d)(2) by deferring to the discretion
conferred by § 1988 would read less into trying to divine Congress’s intent,
since it resolves ambiguity by direct reference to existing law instead of
inferring one of multiple competing interpretations of the text. See id.
Second, the surrounding provisions of § 1997e(d) support deference to
§ 1988. See infra text accompanying notes 150–62.
136. See infra Part IV.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2).
138. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 2001).
139. Id.; see also Eleanor Umphres, 150% Wrong: The Prison Litigation Reform
Act and Attorney’s Fees, 56 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 261, 270–72 (2019).
140. Umphres, supra note 139, at 273.
141. Id. at 273–74.
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greater than 150% of the judgment, but it is unclear why that frustration justifies an irrational interpretation when courts could instead fall
back on § 1988 more generally.142 In a footnote, the Murphy Court
acknowledges the lack of clarity regarding why Congress chose the
language it did for § 1997e(d)(2): “Did anyone voting on the measure
even think about this question? There is no way to know, and we will
not try to guess.”143 The Court was wrestling with the interpretation
the first part of § 1997e(d)(2), but the same uncertainty applies to the
“150 percent” language. There is no way to know what Congress
intended to happen when the fee award exceeds 150% of the judgment
because the statute does not say. That the prevailing guess is based on
flawed logic should be enough to reject it, but the fallacy of the inverse
is not the only reason to reject the fee-capping interpretation of
§ 1997e(d)(2). The 25% fee shift and the 150% fee cap both operate as
indiscriminate limits on available fees, inconsistent with a proper understanding of § 1997e(d) together with § 1988.

IV. An Accurate Reading of § 1997e(d)
The prevailing interpretation of § 1997e(d)(2) returns prisoner
litigation, either in part or in full depending on the judgment, to the
142. See, e.g., McLindon v. Russell, 108 F. Supp. 2d 842, 850–53 (S.D. Ohio
1999), rev’d and vacated in pertinent part, 19 F. App’x 349 (6th Cir.
2001); Umphres, supra note 139, at 276–80. Umphres also offers a possible
explanation for why Congress included the “150 percent” language in
§ 1997e(d)(2), as opposed to imposing a hard cap on fee awards. In what
she dubs “The Reminder Theory,” she suggests that language explaining
what would happen when the fee was greater than 150% of the judgment
was not necessary because of the mathematical impossibility of 25% of the
judgment covering an entire fee award that exceeds 150% of the judgment.
Umphres, supra note 139, at 279–80. She speculates that, in such a case,
it would be obvious that the defendant would cover the excess. Id. On the
other hand, in some instances where the award was less than 150% of the
judgment, the 25% taken from the judgment may or may not cover the
entire award. Id. In this area of relative uncertainty, Congress sought to
“remind” courts that the defendant should still cover the excess no matter
how small the remainder. Id. This theory is less than satisfying, as it
invites the question of why Congress chose 150% instead of 100% or 50%
or 25.01%. Still, the point worth taking is that even the Reminder Theory
is “less absurd than the prevailing reading of the statute, which requires
courts to legislate from the bench, reaching preposterous conclusions that
serve no stated purpose of Congress and that harm civil rights attorneys.”
Id. at 280.
143. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 790 n.2 (2018) (“Did legislators voting
on the measure agree with our interpretation of the first sentence and
drop the confirmatory language from the second as flabby duplication?
Or did they drop it because, as Mr. Murphy supposes, they thought it
erroneous or even just bad policy? Did anyone voting on the measure even
think about this question? There is no way to know, and we will not try
to guess.”).
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traditional American Rule.144 Even when damages are substantial
enough that fees are not capped at 150% of the judgment, prisoner
plaintiffs must pay their own attorney up to 25% of their judgment,
often covering the entire fee.145 If this was Congress’s intent, then the
wording and structure of the statute are an absolute mess. Paragraph
(1) explicitly stops short of excepting all prisoner litigation from the
effects of § 1988 fee shifting, and the plain text of the paragraph (2)
does not replace a reasonable fee with a fee dependent entirely on the
damages.146 Paragraph (2) of § 1997e(d) should be read as it is written.
When applying “a portion of the judgment . . . to satisfy the amount
of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant,”147 judges should have
discretion to determine the size of that portion, so long as they do not
exceed the 25% maximum. No one should read into paragraph (2) a cap
on fees that does not appear in the text.148 This interpretation of
paragraph (2) must prevail for several reasons. First, it is closer to the
plain text of § 1997e(d) than the Court’s interpretation,149 especially
when paragraph (2) is read together with paragraphs (1) and (3).
Second, it better conforms to the purpose of the PLRA of reducing
frivolous suits without unduly restricting meritorious ones. Finally, it
produces results that are less absurd, more consistent, and more just
than the current prevailing interpretation.
A.

Reading the Text and Context of § 1997e(d) as a Whole

In addition to misunderstanding the interplay between §§ 1997e(d)
and 1988, the Murphy Court’s interpretation is flawed in that it goes
straight to § 1988 without first reading § 1997e(d)(2) in the immediate
context of paragraphs (1) and (3).150 Walking through the section start

144. See supra Part I.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 64–72.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (“(1) In any action brought by a prisoner . . . in
which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such
fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that . . . . (2) Whenever a
monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a
portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to
satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If
the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment,
the excess shall be paid by the defendant.” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)). See supra note 115.
147. § 1997e(d)(2).
148. Umphres, supra note 139, at 282–83.
149. See supra Part III.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 111–19.
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to finish can give us a more complete understanding of how each
individual provision should function.151
Paragraph (1) establishes that the default rule is that prisoner
plaintiffs will not be awarded attorney’s fees under § 1988, but that
under certain circumstances “such fees” are available.152 Parts (A) and
(B) of § 1997e(d)(1) provide for those circumstances.153 Part (A) focuses
on ensuring that the fee is sufficiently tied to “an actual violation of
the plaintiff’s rights,” deferring to § 1988 to identify which rights merit
fee shifting.154 Part (B) mandates a proportional relationship between
the amount of the fee and “the court ordered relief.”155 This focus on
relief mirrors the understanding of § 1988 that connects the reasonableness of a fee to the relief granted in vindication of civil rights and not
the damages.156 Paragraph (1) appears to be drafted with an understanding of its role in the context of § 1988 and thus focuses on making
sure prisoner plaintiffs who are awarded attorney’s fees are only being
compensated for fees accrued in connection with actual relief ordered
specifically in response to a violation of one of the rights that § 1988
protects.157
Paragraph (3) reins in any hypothetically high market rates that
would produce a large fee under the lodestar method by capping the
rate at 150% of the rate used to determine pay for court-appointed

151. See Cross, supra note 134, at 88 (“[Some] traditional canons [of statutory
interpretation] . . . establish a presumption that particular words of a statute
should be interpreted according to the company they keep and not viewed
in isolation. . . . [T]hese canons tend to . . . prevent[] laws from covering
matters unrelated to those expressed in the text.”)
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1); see supra note 115.
153. § 1997e(d)(1).
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added). This proportionality requirement applies before
paragraph (2), meaning that the fee-capping provisions cannot be properly
justified through this “proportionately related” language. § 1997e(d)(2)
(“Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in
paragraph (1) . . . .” (emphasis added)). Fees can be awarded under
§ 1997e(d)(1) only if the condition in § 1997e(d)(1)(B) is satisfied, i.e.,
only awards already “proportionately related to the court ordered relief”
can be modified by § 1997e(d)(2). § 1997e(d)(1)(B).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
157. Requiring that fees be “directly and reasonably incurred in proving” a violation
arguably codifies the existing interpretation of § 1988. § 1997e(d)(1)(A);
Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 916 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ‘related claim’
limitation set out in Hensley has been incorporated into the fee limitation
section of the PLRA.”); see Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 834 (2011) (“The
fee award, of course, should not reimburse the plaintiff for work performed
on claims that bore no relation to the grant of relief . . . .” (citing Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983))).
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attorneys.158 By tying the rates to those used for court-appointed
counsel, the statute implicitly recognizes that attorneys representing
prisoners in the vindication of their constitutional rights are serving a
role analogous to the role served by court-appointed counsel. Paragraph
(3) tells attorneys that even if they can charge a little more than if they
had been appointed, they cannot find some great windfall in pressing
prisoner claims: awards are available because they serve the public
interest, so they will reflect the pay of a public servant.159 Thus, even
as paragraphs (1) and (3) work to limit courts’ discretion under section
1988, they stay squarely within that statute’s private-attorney-generaltheory roots.
Paragraphs (1) and (3) also function by addressing specific concerns
regarding awards of attorney’s fees. Where Congress was concerned
with low-value suits clogging up the courts, paragraph (1) ensures that
prisoner plaintiffs will not be compensated for the cost of their
attorney’s work on any unsupported claims that just happen to be
attached to a successful one.160 Where Congress was concerned with
unscrupulous attorneys trying to pass off excessive fees as reasonable
based on the private market, paragraph (3) mandates a rate less subject
to manipulation or market whims.161
Why would Congress craft careful, targeted policy vehicles in
paragraphs (1) and (3), but use paragraph (2) to apply rough and
indiscriminate fee-award reductions that penalize meritorious claimants
at least as much as they deter frivolous litigants? There is another
explanation. Proponents of the PLRA were also concerned with the
overall cost of prisoner litigation to states and taxpayers through the
state-funded defense of correctional institutions and their officials.162
This concern presents a unique problem under the private-attorneygeneral theory: fee shifting is supposed to deter wrongdoers,163 so these
costs are a feature of § 1988 rather than a bug. Where a prison or its
officer engages in wrongdoing—but after applying all the other
provisions of the PLRA, the prevailing prisoner plaintiff is granted a
relatively small award of damages—fee shifting is an essential aspect of
our system of civil-rights litigation and the private-attorney-general
theory is operating exactly as conceived.164 Proponents of the PLRA,
however, also conceived of state-funded institutions shelling out
millions in damages, perhaps out of proportion to the evil perpetrated
158. See supra text accompanying notes 55–70.
159. See § 1997e(d)(3).
160. See Winslow, supra note 83, at 1662–64.
161. See Branham, supra note 24, at 1021; Hart, supra note 90, at 82–83.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94.
163. See supra Part I.
164. See supra Part I.
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by the defendant.165 In the latter scenario, the hypothetical hypersuccessful prisoner plaintiff might be in a better position to pay her own
attorney’s fees than the resource-poor government defendant. It would
be exceedingly difficult for Congress to predict which kinds of cases
would result in which of the two foregoing scenarios and legislate
accordingly, but any egregious imbalance would be apparent to judges
applying the PLRA to attorney’s fees awarded after the case has been
litigated and a judgment has been entered.
Viewed through this perspective, paragraph (2) is a careful solution
to a particular problem, and it is drafted with the same awareness of
the private-attorney-general theory, § 1988, and the lodestar method
that is demonstrated in paragraphs (1) and (3). The first sentence
provides direction to judges on how they should apply the discretion
conferred on them by § 1988.166 It addresses Congress’s concern that fee
shifting might provide some prisoner plaintiffs with a windfall by giving
judges the power to reallocate “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed
25 percent)” toward the fee award.167 In the scenario that proponents
of the PLRA probably had in mind—prisoner plaintiffs earning
excessive damages—some portion of the judgment less than 25% very
well may discharge the entire fee and still leave the plaintiff with
enough compensation that she is made whole. In those cases, the
litigants are justly returned to the American Rule because the concerns
that drive private-attorney-general fee shifting are mitigated by the
large award and offset by congressional concerns about the cost to
taxpayers.168 Most prevailing prisoner plaintiffs, however, would fit into
the other scenario, where all the justifications for private attorneygeneral fee shifting would apply.169 In those cases, judges would be free
to take only some nominal amount, such as a penny or a dollar, from
the judgment to apply to the fee award.170 In close cases, judges would
165. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94. This is probably not a realistic
view of prisoner litigation; even before the PLRA, prisoners rarely prevailed
and prevailing prisoner plaintiffs were awarded lower damages on average
than their nonprisoner counterparts. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784,
793 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
166. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 797 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Just as
these surrounding statutory provisions in § 1997e(d) set outward bounds
on a district court’s exercise of discretion while still preserving the exercise
of discretion within those bounds, so, too, does § 1997e(d)(2).”).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2).
168. See supra Part I; see Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 2009)
(Loken, C.J., concurring).
169. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 793. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The prisoner plaintiff
is at a disadvantage, likely to have difficulty finding or affording representation under the American Rule, and is vindicating an important right.
See supra Part I.
170. See, e.g., Morrison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
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have to weigh the appropriate factors under the specific circumstances
and decide whether some other portion, e.g., 10% of the judgment, was
most appropriate.171 It should not alarm the Court that Congress might
trust courts to use their wisdom and experience to promulgate their
own standards regarding how to determine what percentage of the
judgment should be applied to the fee award. Indeed, that process is
precisely how we got from the unwieldy general discretion conferred
upon courts by § 1988 to the widely embraced lodestar method.172
The Murphy Court wondered why Congress would use the word
“shall” to mandate that some portion of the judgment apply to the
award if the drafters of the PLRA envisioned judges subverting the
mandate by applying only a negligible amount.173 Under the
interpretation of § 1997e(d)(2) described above, the answer could be
that Congress wanted to make sure judges duly considered the equitable
adjustments to fee shifting that any situation might demand. If Congress anticipated that judges would be hesitant to dip into a judgment
of damages determined by a jury, then it makes sense to include a
statutory mandate that judges apply some portion, any portion up to
25% of the judgment, because doing so forces judges to consider what
amount is appropriate rather than deferring to juries or to the
presumptively reasonable lodestar amount.174
If the first part of § 1997e(d)(2) mandates that courts exercise their
discretion, then the second part—the so-called 150% fee cap—can be
read as a limit on that discretion, which flows originally from § 1988.
Under earlier conceptions of a reasonable fee under § 1988, judges had
discretion to “adjust the [initial] fee [calculation] upward or downward”
in order to achieve the most just fee-shifting result.175 Thus, the first
part of paragraph (2) could be read as giving courts a tool with which
to adjust the fee downward and inviting them to use it when appropriate.176 The second sentence then directs courts not to further adjust
the amount downward unless the fee is “greater than 150 percent of the

171. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, (2d Cir. 2011); Kahle, 563
F.3d at 743.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 123–28.
173. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 787 (“If Congress had wished to afford the judge more
discretion in this area, it could have easily substituted ‘may’ for ‘shall.’”).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 124–29.
175. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
176. If paragraphs (1) and (3) represent codification and slight adjustments to
fee shifting based on the existing common-law understanding of § 1988 at
the time, it is conceivable that Congress borrowed concepts from cases like
Hensley to determine the best ways to direct courts to exercise discretion
under paragraph (2) as well.
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judgment.”177 Courts retain their discretion when the award of attorney’s fees is greater than 150% of the judgment, and they can exercise
it to reduce the award if appropriate—or not, hence the silence regarding what happens when the award exceeds 150% of the judgment.178
The interpretation described above assumes only that Congress
meant what it said, and that it was familiar with the applicable precedent when it did; to the extent the § 1997e(d) is ambiguous, it lets
§ 1988 fill in the gaps. The existing interpretation embraced by Murphy,
on the other hand, construes the statute to have a meaning that might
be textually plausible, but is less consistent with the surrounding text
and the general purpose of the PLRA.179 Even ignoring the statutory
purpose of the PLRA, the interpretation described here better adheres
to the plain text and structure of the statute. The fee-cap interpretation
infers a mandatory provision that applies in a situation not considered
by the plain text, and it is based on the application of a logical fallacy.180
Instead of making assumptions about meaning based on flawed logic, it
is better to resolve the silence of the plain text by reference to the larger
statutory scheme, in this case the context provided in paragraphs (1)
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (“If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than
150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.”).
178. Id. The decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 116 (1992), denying an
award of fees under § 1988 because the plaintiff received only nominal
damages, has been used to provide support for an interpretation of
§ 1997e(d)(2) that caps fees. Bovin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir.
2000) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Farrar,
the contrast that Boivin seeks to depict may be more apparent than
real.”). But Farrar, decided before the PLRA was enacted, chastised the
lower court for not exercising its discretion to limit the award. Farrar,
506 U.S. at 114 (“Yet the District Court calculated petitioners’ fee award
in precisely this fashion, without engaging in any measured exercise of
discretion.”). Moreover, the famous pronouncement is that “[w]hen a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an
essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee
is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115 (citation omitted). Besides being
qualified by the Court’s use of the word “usually,” the reasoning is that
the failure to prove damages indicates that the plaintiff has “prevailed”
to a lesser degree. In prisoner cases, however, the PLRA prevents recovery
of damages for non-physical injuries, § 1997e(e), and First Amendment
and due-process cases often include extreme violations, with the potential
to spawn critical institutional change, but yield only nominal damages.
See, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally,
Farrar states that “[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally
‘prevails’ under § 1988 should receive no attorney’s fees at all.” Farrar,
506 U.S. at 115. If the existing scheme under § 1988 allows for courts to
deny fees in some cases where the plaintiff received only nominal damages,
then the application of the fee cap is redundant in those circumstances
and affects only plaintiffs whose claims merit an award under § 1988
despite Farrar.
179. See infra Part IV(B)–(C).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 139–42.
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and (3) first and deference to § 1988 second. Rather than finding the
meaning of paragraph (2) best supported by the surrounding text, the
Murphy majority twisted the words of the statute by plucking them out
of context and comparing them to § 1988, ultimately making assumptions about what Congress “wished” to do in order to arrive at its conclusion.181 The interpretation presented here, by contrast, resolves any
ambiguity by looking at § 1997e(d) as a whole and landing on a
meaning that is arguably better supported by the plain text, without
having to speculate about what Congress intended when it passed the
PLRA.182 Congress could have easily used plain language to indicate
that fee awards should be capped at 150% of the judgment, or that
courts must apply as much of the judgment as possible up to the 25%
limit.183 As the Murphy Court explained: “But Congress didn’t choose
those other words. And respect for Congress’s prerogatives as policymaker means carefully attending to the words it chose rather than replacing them with others of our own.”184
B.

The Murphy Interpretation Does Not Help Reduce Frivolous
Prisoner Suits

While it is difficult to divine exactly why the drafters of the PLRA
wrote § 1997e(d)(2) the way that they did, the overall purpose of the
statute is no mystery. Congress wanted to reduce frivolous prisoner
litigation, and proponents of the PLRA believed it would do that without substantially frustrating meritorious claims.185 Section 1997e(d)(2),
as the Murphy Court construed it, does not reduce frivolous prisoner
litigation, but it does directly harm prisoner plaintiffs who prevail.186
181. See supra text accompanying notes 110–22; Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct.
784, 789 (2018) (“If Congress had wished to confer the same discretion in
§ 1997e(d) that it conferred in § 1988(b), we very much doubt it would have
bothered to write a new law; omit all the words that afforded discretion
in the old law; and then replace those old discretionary words with new
mandatory ones.”).
182. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 792 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). If we are going to
speculate about Congress’s wishes, we may as well consider the legislative
purpose of the statute, which would support the interpretation described
in this section over the one embraced by Murphy. See infra Subpart IV(B).
183. Id. at 794 (“The statute, for example, simply could have said: ‘Twenty-five
percent of the plaintiff’s judgment shall be applied to satisfy the amount
of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.’”). Congress could have
written: “no attorney’s fees awarded shall exceed 150% of the judgment”
or “any award of attorney’s fees exceeding 150% of the judgment shall be
reduced to that amount.”
184. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 787–88 (majority opinion).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 75–89.
186. Umphres, supra note 139, at 274–75 (“The fee cap only comes into play
once a lawyer has won his or her suit—not frivolous by virtue of being
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Applying § 1997e(d)(2) to cap and un-shift attorney’s fees does
nothing to deter prisoners from filing frivolous suits or attorneys from
representing them that is not already accomplished by the underlying
§ 1988 fee-shifting scheme.187 Attorneys already know that § 1988
grants fees only to prevailing parties, and the other provisions of the
PLRA make prevailing that much more difficult.188 If anything, pressing
a frivolous claim will cost an attorney money, even with the privateattorney-general theory motivating them to find meritorious ones.189
The fee caps read into § 1997e(d)(2) do, however, deter meritorious
claims by reducing the likelihood that they will be worthwhile for attorneys.190 If anything, this deterrence frustrates the prevention of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits. Well-counseled prisoners are less likely to file and
press frivolous claims, and attorneys already have a disincentive under
§ 1988 to include “noncompensable and sanction-inviting claims.”191
The alternate interpretation described above, however, allows prevailing prisoner plaintiffs that suffered a significant violation of their
constitutional rights to recover a complete reasonable attorney’s fee
while also providing a relief valve for situations in which fee shifting is
not warranted but the plaintiff nonetheless prevails.192
C.

Disparate Results

Part of the Murphy majority’s justification for its interpretation of
§ 1997e(d)(2) is that removing the discretion of trial judges will lead to

meritorious—so the fee cap has no bearing on whether the attorney initially
chooses to take on a potentially frivolous case.” (footnote omitted)).
187. Branham, supra note 24, at 1023–25; Umphres, supra note 139, at 274–
75.
188. Branham, supra note 24, at 1024.
189. Id.
190. Umphres, supra note 139, at 274–75. This chilling effect is not merely hypothetical. In one case, an attorney accepted an appointment to represent a
prisoner under the belief that he would be able to recover fees, and when
he realized the PLRA would limit any such award, he attempted to withdraw. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 910 (6th Cir. 2004). The court barred
the withdrawal, and the prisoner, represented by counsel, won on all four
of his claims, securing a judgment of just over $25,000. Id. It is worth
noting here that proved claims cannot be the only ones with value; plausible
claims are not frivolous just because they ultimately lose. Nothing about
the PLRA suggests that it should be applied to frustrate weak-butnonfrivolous claims, much less risky-but-winnable ones like those in Riley
v. Kurtz.
191. Branham, supra note 24, at 1024 (“Encouraging attorneys to represent
prisoners with civil rights claims by promising them reasonable compensation for their work if they prevail will actually reduce both the initial filing,
and the continued pursuit of, frivolous claims by prisoners.”).
192. See supra Subpart IV(A).
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more consistent results.193 The Court is confusing the most straightforward test with the most consistent one. Under the interpretation
that prevailed in Murphy, every prisoner plaintiff who prevails and is
awarded fees will have to either pay those fees in full out of their
judgment or have 25% of their judgment applied toward the fee award,
regardless of the details of their case or the nature of the violation.194
This rule is easy for judges to apply, but it produces absurd results that
bear no rational relationship to traditional fee-shifting analysis. Combined with the 150% fee cap, the determining factor will be the damages
award.195 Inexplicably, the fees will only ever shift completely from a
prisoner plaintiff to the defendant in claims for injunctive relief, when
§ 1997e(d)(2) does not apply.196 In effect, these provisions discard
§ 1988’s mandate that fee shifting is appropriate even when the plaintiff
receives little to no damages, and ignore the presumption that the
lodestar method produces reasonable fees.197 All else equal, getting beat
up by a correctional officer while confined is de jure less compensable
than getting beat up by a police officer on the sidewalk.198 This outcome
is difficult to reconcile with the stated purpose of the PLRA.199
The accurate reading of the statute, however, provides judges some
limited discretion over fee shifting in order to mitigate inconsistent results. Without the fee cap, the starting point is the usual reasonable fee
calculated using §§ 1988 and 1997e(d)(3).200 If that fee is anomalously
high, then the judge can apply toward the award whatever “portion of
the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent)” restores the proper balance.201
193. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 790 (2018).
194. Id. (“[W]e hold that district courts must apply as much of the judgment
as necessary, up to 25%, to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees.”).
195. When the award exceeds 150% of the judgment, calculating fees can literally
be reduced to an extremely simple equation where the only variable is the
size of the judgment: 1.25x or 2.25x for the plaintiff’s total compensation.
When the award is less than 150% of the judgment, the size of the judgment still dictates who shoulders the burden of the fee award. Either the
judgment is so substantial that the award is less than 25% of the judgment
and the plaintiff pays her own fees, or the reasonable fee calculated by
the lodestar method is reduced by a full quarter of the judgment.
196. See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f nonmonetary relief is obtained, either with or without money damages,
§ 1997e(d)(2) would not apply.”).
197. See supra text accompanying note 55–58, 127–29.
198. Branham, supra note 24, at 1042.
199. See Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 847–48 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 612–15 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Rovner, J., dissenting).
200. See supra Subpart IV(A).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2019); see Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736, 743
(8th Cir. 2009) (Loken, C.J., concurring).

782

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 3·2022
Murphy's Law

Results under this method can be no more disparate than the results of
§ 1988 in non-prisoner cases. If the Court’s concern in Murphy was that
courts would come to wildly different conclusions about how to determine the appropriate portion to apply, the majority could have defined
a test to guide them, as they ultimately did for determining a reasonable
fee under § 1988.202 As is, we get outcomes like Royal v. Kautzky:
disabled prisoners can be forced to go weeks without a wheelchair in
retaliation for filing grievances, sue for a constitutional violation, win,
and be compensated with a mere $2.50 including damages and attorney’s fees.203 Then again, Royal was decided in 2004; now, under
Murphy, Royal would get only $2.25.

Conclusion
The ultimate effect of Murphy is to indiscriminately reduce the
value, in real dollars, of prisoners’ constitutional rights.204 The American
Rule supplanted the English Rule for the sake of greater access to the
courts, and the private-attorney-general theory took us a step further
in the name of the public interest and the sacredness of critical constitutional rights.205 The fee-capping provision of the PLRA, however,
constitutes a stumble backward at the expensive of one of the most
vulnerable populations in the country. There is little chance the Court
will correct course.206 Nor is Congress a sure bet. Public opinion on
prisoner issues has changed somewhat since the mid-1990s,207 but
because it is so technical, it is hard to get lay voters impassioned about
legislative action attacking the PLRA.208 Many advocate for much

202. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
203. 375 F.3d 720, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
204. See supra Parts III–IV.
205. See supra Part I.
206. There remains a circuit split regarding whether the fee-cap provision in
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) applies to fees incurred on appeal. Compare
Woods v. Carey 722 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2013) (refusing to apply
§ 1997e(d)(2) to fees incurred on appeal), with Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d
906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying § 1997e(d)(2) to fees incurred through
appeal, limiting the ultimate award to 150% of the judgment). If the
Court took up the question, it could revisit the whole of paragraph (2),
but there is no reason to think Murphy would be overturned or the 150%
fee cap—which currently enjoys circuit-court consensus—would be rejected.
207. Macfarlane, supra note 85, at 1188.
208. John Pfaff, The 1994 Crime Law Hogs the Legal Reform Spotlight. But a
Lesser-Known Law Deserves More Attention, Appeal (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/1994-crime-law-biden/ [https://perma.cc/MT7H5MFX].
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broader prison reform,209 including repealing the PLRA in total,210 but
real change is slow coming. Amending the PLRA by eliminating or
clarifying § 1997e(2) to supersede Murphy and eliminate the fee cap
should be a noncontroversial, incremental change that has the potential
revitalize the role of courts in protecting prisoner rights.
Fee shifting in prisoner civil-rights cases is warranted. Plaintiffs like
Mr. Murphy deserve to be made whole, whether they are a prisoner
beaten up by a guard or a free citizen abused by a police officer. Unfortunately, for now, we are stuck with the fee cap and the Murphy rule,
which twist the words of the statute to be as hostile to prisoners as
possible.
Mark J. Firmin†

209. ACLU Policy Priorities for Prison Reform, ACLU https://www.aclu.org/
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